## Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 /001 W

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2406

S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 4215

NODIS

E.O. 12065: XGDS-2 4/10/99 (CONSTABLE, PETER D) OR-M

PEPR, MNUC, EAID, PINT, PK, US

SUBJECT: COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MEETING WITH PRESIDENT

ZIA UL-HAQ

REF: ISLAMABAD 4206

- 1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. THIS MESSAGE WILL DEALY ONLY WITH THE NUCLEAR ASPECT OF MY DISCUSSIONS WITH ZIA. COMMENTS ON THE OTHER PORTIONS WILL AWAIT ZIA'S PROMISED RESPONSE TO OUR PROPOSALS. I HOPE WE WILL HEAR WITHIN A FEW DAYS THAT THE GOP WOULD WELCOME A VISIT BY U.S. OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS SECURITY CONCERNS UNDER THE 1959 BILATERAL AND THAT OUR OTHER PROPOSALS ARE ACCEPTABLE.
- 3. THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS FLOW FROM TWO CONCLUSIONS FROM MY MEETING: (A) ZIA WAS GENUINELY TAKEN ABACK BY VIGOR OF U.S. RESPONSE TO PAKISTAN'S ENRICHMENT PROGRAM AND IS CONCERNED ABOUT A WEAKENING OF HIS OWN POSITION DOMESTICALLY. THE COINCIDENCE OF INTERNAL TENSIONS OVER BHUTTO EXECUTION, THE THREAT FROM SOVS/ AFGHANS, AND THE NOW-WIDESPREAD PUBLICITY OF U.S. AID CUT-OFF ALL PUT UNUSUAL PRESSURES ON ZIA AND HIS GOVERNMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, MANY PAKISTANIS, UNAWARE OF THE DETAILS OF SECRET PAK ENRICHMENT ACTIVITY SECRET

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OR ITS PURPOSE, CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE VERY RESENTFUL OF "U.S. PRESSURES" AT A TIME WHEN PAKISTAN NEEDS INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. ZIA WAS, HOWEVER, RELIEVED THAT OUR ACTION DID NOT PRESAGE A FUNDAMENTAL U.S. SHIFT AWAY FROM PAKISTAN. (B) OUR PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON NUCLEAR ISSUE PROVIDE AN OPENING FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS; IN PARTICULAR, AN OPPORTUNITY IS PRESENTED BY ZIA'S INSISTENCE THAT ONLY

"RESEARCH ACTIVITIES" (BY IMPLICATION IN ENRICHMENT) ARE GOING ON. THERE MAY BE A WAY TO GET ZIA TO HOLD THAT PROGRAM AT ITS PRESENT RUDIMENTARY LEVEL WHERE IT CANNOT PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF ENRICHED MATERIAL.

- 4. IT IS PERHAPS A LONG-SHOT TO THINK THAT WE CAN USE THESE OPENINGS TO ADVANCE MATERIALLY OUR NON-PROLIFERATION GOALS, BUT I BELIEVE WE MUST TRY AND THEREFORE SUBMIT THESE PROPOSALS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING LIMITATIONS:
- --WE CANNOT EXPECT PAKISTAN TO AGREE TO UNILATERAL INSPECTION
- --NOR WILL PAKISTAN AGREE AT THIS STAGE TO DISMANTLE WHAT IT DESCRIBES AS RESEARCH FACILITIES.
- 5. I RECOMMEND WE PROPOSE TO THE GOP THAT WE ENTER BROAD TALKS WITH PAKISTAN AND OTHER CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS TO EXPAND THE IDEAS FORESHADOWED IN PARA 10 OF STATE 085585. IN ORDER TO TIVE THESE TALKS THE BEST POSSIBLE CHANCE TO REACH USEFUL CONCLUSIONS THAT WOULD MEET PAKISTAN'S LEGITMATE CONCERNS OVER A POSSIBLE NUCLEAR THREAT, PAKISTAN AND THE U.S. WOULD EACH TAKE A SIGNIFICANT STEP TO PROVIDE MUTUAL REASSURANCE OF THE BONA FIDES OF THE OTHER. PAKISTAN WOULD "FREEZE" ITS PRESENT ENRICHMENT ACTIVITY AT THE PRESENT EXPERIMENTAL LEVEL, I.E., THE SMALL CHAKLALA ERL 8 CENTRIFUGE SECRET

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FACILITY, AND WOULD SUSPEND FURTHER ACTIVITY ON THE SIHALA AND KAHUTA PROJECTS. THE U.S. WOULD IN TURN SEEK WAYS TO LIFT THE BAN ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND IMET, EITHER THROUGH USE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER OR THROUGH AN AMENDMENT IN THE LEGISLATION.

6. THE U.S. WOULD NOT SEEK INSPECTION OF THE ERL OR OTHER FACILITIES BUT WOULD MAKE CLEAR TO PAKISTAN THAT ANY FURTHER ACTIVITY AT THE SIHALA, KAHUTA, OR ANY OTHER RNRICHMENT FACILITY WOULD AUTOMATICALLY RE-TRIGGER THE SYMINGTON AMENDMENT. AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF DETERRING THE GOP FROM "CHEATING" AND TO PERSUADE THEM THAT OUR "VERIFICATION" TECHNIQUES ARE GOOD, WE WOULD SHARE WITH THE GOP A FAIRLY DETAILED ACCOUNT OF WHAT WE NOW KNOW ABOUT THEIR PLANS FOR EXPANDED ENRICHMENT FACILITIES. WHILE THIS "SALT-TYPE" MONITORING SYSTEM COULD SEEM TO UNDERCUT OUR WORLDWIDE POLICIES ON SAFEGUARDS AND INSPECTIONS, IT SHOULD BE SEEN AS A NECESSARY INTERIM STEP TO PREVENT FURTHER PROLIFERATION ACTIVITY WHILE A PERMANENT SOLUTION TO SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROBLEMS IS DEVELOPED. ACTIVELY WORKING TOWARD A FREEZE AT THE PRESENT LEVEL COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF FORESTALLING INDIAN MOVEMENT TOWARD A WEAPONS PROGRAM.

7. FOLLOWING ON A "FREEZE" AND RESTORATION OF U.S.
ASSISTANCE, U.S. AND OTHERS, SUCH AS UK, WOULD UNDERTAKE
DISCUSSIONS WITH GOP, INDIA, CHINA, AND POSSIBLY SOVIETS
ON ARRANGEMENTS THAT MIGHT BE MADE EITHER TO INSURE SOME
VARIANT OF A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE OR, ALTERNATIVELY, SATISFACTORY
MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD MEET PAKISTAN'S FEAR
OF A NUCLEAR THREAT. INITIALLY WE WOULD PRESUMABLY WANT
TO AVOID SPELLING OUT IN ANY DETAIL TO GOP WHAT WE HAVE IN
MIND FOR THESE MULTILATERAL TALKS, LEST WE QUICKLY BOG
DOWN IN GOP DEMANS FOR PARITY TREATMENT WITH INDIA.
OBVIOUSLY IF WE WERE ABLE TO EFFECT THE FIRST STEP--FREEZE
AND AID RESTORATION--WE WILL PROBABLY HAVE BOUGHT OURSELVES
A LARGE MEASURE OF TIME, PERHAPS YEARS, TO WORK TOWARD
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BROADER NON-PROLIFERATION ARRANGEMENTS--POSSIBLY EVEN EXTENDING WELL BEYOND SOUTH ASIA.

8. I URGE THAT WASHINGTON GIVE RAPID HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION TO THIS APPROACH AND, IF IT IS CONSIDERED FEASIBLE, THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO BROACH IT TO ZIA AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME WHILE HE IS STILL PREOCCUPIED WITH THE INTERNAL DAMAGE TO HIS POSITION FROM OUR AID CUT-OFF. IF THIS PROPOSAL HAS MERIT, IT WILL ALSO BE IMPORTANT TO ASSURE THAT ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FUNDS NOT RPT NOT BE REPROGRAMMED UNTIL WE ARE SATISFIED THAT THERE IS NO BASIS FOR REINSTITUTION OF OUR PROGRAMS HERE.

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